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ABSTRACT 
The resource cost of operating the income tax system is large, totalling 
as much as seven to eight percent of revenue raised.  One source of this cost 
is  the system of itemized deductions,  which can require extensive record 
keeping and calculation. 
This paper estimates the resource cost of itemizing deductions.  In 
contrast to previous studies of  compliance cost which rely on  survey evidence, 
we infer this evidence from data reported on  tax returns which suggest that 
there exists taxpayers who would save money by itemizing but who choose not 
We find that in 1982 the private cost of itemizing totalled $1.4L 
billion, or $3  per itemizing taxpayer.  The compliance cost dissuaded from 
itemizing over 650,000 taxpayers who would have thereby saved taxes,  causing 
an extra tax liability of nearly $200 million.  Increasing the standard 
deduction  by $1,000 would save $100  million in resources that would otherwise 
have been devoted to itemizing. 
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1.  Introduction 
The reenirce cost of operating the income tsx system is large.  Although 
economists have traditionalty focused on the allocative effects of taxatIon, 
Slemrod and Sorom (1984) recently eatmated the direct cost of collecting Lndi— 
vldual income taxes in 1982 to be between $30 and $35 billion, or seven to 
eight  percent of revenues raised.  They found that the time spent by taxpayers 
in complying aith the tsx law (spproximstely two billion hours, or twenty  tours 
per tax Jeer and one hundred million rsxpsyers) is equivslent  to s hidden  bu- 
reaucracy of one million full—time civil servants.  Approxmstely  three—fourths 
of this cost ass borne directly by taxpayers (as  opposed to the Internal Rev- 
enue  Service) in the process of record keeping, resesrching  the tsx law,  and 
preparing  the tax return itself.  This high cost is adely perceived, se evi- 
denced hy the emphasis in the recent tax reform effort on simplificstion,  which 
presumablj  is  related to reducing the resource cost of opersting the system. 
The Tax Reform Act of  1986 reduced marginal tax rates, incressed the stsndsrd 
deduction, snd eliminated some itemized deductions, sll of which srgushly could 
reduce the cost of collection.  However, the econometric snalysfs presented in 
Slemrod  (1985) could find no support thst reducing margnsl tax rates would 
reduce complsnce cost,  It did, though, suggest that reducing the fraction of 
taxpayers  that  itemize deductions would  reduce compliance cost sigmificsntly. 
This paper provides further evidence about  the compliance cost of itemiz- 
ing deductions  and the determinants of the cost.  Tn contrast to all previous 
studies which rely on  survey evidence, we infer this evidence from data re- 
ported  on tsx returna, which of course contain no direct information on com- 
pliance coats.  We do, though, observe enough information about itemizing and nonitemiziog taxpayers to suggest that there exist taxpayers who would save 
mooey by  itemiziog but do  oot choose to.  We  postulate that they so choose 
beoauae the compliante ooat of itemizing exceeds the tax saving that oao be 
obtaioed,  This allows us  to estimate the magoitude aod determinaote of the 
coat of itemiziog deductiooa,  We fiod that io 1982 the private ooat of item— 
iziog totalled S1.44 billion, or $43 per itemizing taxpayer. 
That legitimate reductions in tax liability are frequently foregone by tax- 
payers has been recognized in the past.  Perhaps the moat striking example of 
this was documented by  Steuerle, McHugh, and Sunley (1978), who found that only 
31.3% of those eligible (and who therefore could have saved money)  for income 
averaging did so in 1971.  Eligible non—electors on  average passed up potential 
savings of $114 (1971 dollars).  They  noted  that the fraction of those eligible 
using income averaging increased substantially with adjusted gross income. 
The phenomenon of non—participation in apparently rewarding government 
programs has been observed io  other contexts.  Moffitt (1983) noted  that, in 
1970, only 69% of families eligible for 4  to Families with  dependent  children 
participated in the program, while the food stamp participation  rate wee only 
38%.  Moffitt modeled this behavior as resulting from "stigma," the disutility 
arising from participation in a welfare program £!Li!,  However,  he remarks 
in  a footnote that 
"Another possible explanation  is that the costs of applying for the 
program and of complying with the myriad  program regulations make the 
benefit not worth the effort in obtaining and keeping it; that is,tne 
transaction costa may be too high.  This phenomenon is almost  impossible 
to distinguish  from stigma, so  it is ignored here." 
There  is no stigma attached to itemizing one's deductions on a tax form. 
We conclude that it is the transactions cost of itemizing that causes some tax- 
payers  who could pay less  in taxes by  itemizing to choose  instead to us  the 
standard deduction. —3— 
Section  2 of the paper deecribea  the empirical model that underlies the 
analysis.  The data are deacribed  in Section  3.  The econometric  reaulta are 
preaented in Section 4, along with the estimates of the coata of compliance 
and tax saving foregone by not ttemizing for various groupa of taxpayera.  In 
addition, the model ia used to predict the effect of  alternative mnimun stan- 
dard deduction levels.  Section 5 offers aome concluding remarks. 
2.  The Empirical Model 
At  the begtnning of the tax year, taxpayers are assumed to know their in- 
come, marginal tax rate, and other actors that influence the dollar amount of 
deductible activities  that will be undertaken during  the tax year.  In addi- 
tion,  they know all factors that affect the "cost of itemizing."  This coat may 
iodide actoal  and imputed compliance coats such as the value of time required 
to  collate receipts and fill out forms and the costs of purchased accounting 
services,  In addition, the private coat of itemizing includes the psychic 
costs  (or  benefits) related  to the compliance activity.  The cost of itemizing 
En  some nay include fear of complcstfng  one's relationship with a powerful 
agency of the state——this  cost may not be entirely psychic, as the probability 
of audit may depend on the itemization decision.  On the other hand, one night 
obtain psychic astiefsction  from reducing tax payments In excess of  the  re- 
source costs of compliance st the margin.  For example, it might be  that s tax- 
payer values dollars paid to the state to a way that reflects his polticsl or 
other judgments concerning its expenditure or  other policies.  Alternatively, 
one might simply enjoy the activity of minimizing  tax payments. 
The slteroative  to itemizing deductions is to take the standard deduction, 
which  is s known amount depending only on  marital snd household status.  The 
taxpayer sill itemize only if the tax saving from itemizing  (TSi)__defined 
as the tax bill if the minimum standard deduction is chosen less the tax bill if 
itemizing is chosen——exceeds  the (private) cost of complying with the require- 
ments of itemization.  The tax savings from itemizing depends on  the demand for 
deductible  items by the ith taxpayer and the tax function.  Tax savings, TS., 
is modeled as a Linear function of s vector of observable exogenous variables 
(Xl which may affect both the demand  for deductible  items and the tax function 
conditional on this demand.  Formally, 
(I)  Ti  =X3+u 
i  i  i' 
where u.  is an error  term summarizing all the unobservable influences on  Ti, 
including preference heterogeneity,  and F ia a vector  of unknown parameters. 
The coat of compliance (C.) ia similarly modeled as a linear function of a set 
of  observable exogenous  regresaora (Z,) and an error  term (v.) 
(2)  C.  = Zy + v.  1  1  1 
The errora u  and v,  are assumed to be  diatributed  aa joint normal with zero 
i  1. 
means and covariance matrix 
20  u  uv 
0  0  uv  v 
Taxpayers will itemize only if TSi > 
Ci. 
Define a dummy varfable  such 
that 
(3)  = 1  1ff Ti. > Ci 
= U  otherwise. 
It ia clear that Ti. is only observed when I 
= 1  and that Ci is never observed. 
We do know if Tii 
< C, and can write the probability  of this event as (4)  Frob(TS C C)  Zy_-_X3> 
where 9(  ) is  the standard normal  cumulative function and o 
2 ÷  2 — 
u  v 
20v)2 
is the standard deviation of (u — v).  Defining f(u, v) as the bivariare 
normal density of u and v,  then the likelihood  function is 
TS — 
XIS 
(5)  L(f, y,  )  =  if  I  f(TS 
— 
XIS,  v)dv  (Z( 
- 
XIS) 
1=1  -  1=0  5 
This  modei corresponds  to the censored regression model with  an unobserved 
stochastic censoring threshold considered by  Gronau  (1974), and Nelson (1977). 
Nelson demonstrated that identification  requires that either o  0 or that  uv 
at least one variable in X.  is not included in 2,.  The zero error covariance 
L  t 
restriction, requiring that unobservablea  that influence tax savings are ortho— 
qonal  to unobservables  influencing compliance coat,  does not have clear justi- 
fication.  Fortunately, a strong case can be made that not all variables in  F. 
which  influence tax savings also  influence compliance cost.  These restrictions 
arise from the belief that compliance  coat depends on the complexity of the 
irmization  process but not on the dollar value of the individual deductions, 
so that ;ariablea which affect dollar values and not complexity are sources of 
identifying  restrictions.  The actual  Identifying reatrctiona  used are 
described below. 
3.  Data 
The data used for  this study are drawn from the 1982 Treasury Tax File. 
This is a stratified random sample of individual income tax returns ahich heav- 
ily ovetaamplea high income tax returns.  Although  the  1982 sample contains 
over 116,000 recorda, for computational aconomy we work with  a one—ia—four  sam- 
ple of the original file, totalling 29,407 tax records.  The sample used in the estimation contained only chose tax returns for which adjusted gross income lay 
in the tnterval $5,000 to $100,000 and which were nnt excluded for certain 
other  reasons described below.  The sample used  in the estimation totalled 
13,409 tax returns, 
There are four classes of taxpayers who were required to itemize deductions 
even if these deductions sum to less than the standard deduction.  Clearly the 
model described above does not apply to these taxpayers.  These classes are U) 
married  taxpayers who file separate returns, (ii) individuals with  earned in- 
come  lass  than the standard deduction claimed as a dependent on their parents' 
return, (iii) nonresident  alien individuals, and (tv) U.S. citizens who exclude 
income from sources fn U.S. possessions.  We deal with  class  (f) by  eliminating 
from the sample  all married taxpayers filing ssparatsly,  and deal with  class 
(ii) by eliminating  all single taxpayers with earned income less than the stan- 
dard  deduction.  We do not have the information  required to  identify taxpayera 
who are in categories  (iii) and (iv).  We rely on  the fact that these situa- 
tions are rare. 
The dependent variable in the tax asvings equation is scaled as ln(TS, + 
1700).  This form restricts predicted tax savings to be no  less than minus 
$1,700, which is the lowest possible potential tax saving, occurring when po- 
tential itemized deductions are zero and the marginel  tax rats is 0.5, the 
statutory maximum.  Hence this functional form restricts potentially  deductible 
expenses to be non—negative.  The unobserved dependent variable in the associ— 
iated cost of itemizing equation becomes ln(C 
+ 1700),  thus preserving the 
taxpayer's decision rule (equation 3). 
The explanatory  variables in 
)t 
and  are described  in Table  1.  The tax- 
payer characteristic variables (age status, mental status, number of personal Table  1 
Explanatory Variables 
In  bot'i X  and Z 
1  1 
Mar:  I  if  married,  0  otherwise 
AGI:  natural logarithm of adjusted gross income 
ACISQ:  squared natural logarithm of adjusted gross income 
Businesa:  =  1  if  farm or businesa income, 0 otherwise 
Aged:  number of  aged exemptions  taken 
Exempt:  number  of  taxpayer exemptions 
In  only (identifying): 
Invinc:  logarithm of positive inveatment income 
Statetax:  the average rate of atate income and sales tax in  1982  at $40,000 
(1979 dollars) of adjusted gross income times AGI1 
Froptax:  the average affective rate of property taxes in the taxpayers 
state  times AOl,  19822 
Medcost:  Index of atats medical costs3 
Sources:  1,  Tax ratee  taken from Feenberg and Rosen  (1985), Table  4.2a, 
Column  ii. 
2.  Tax rates  taken from AdvIsory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations  (1985), p.  106. 
3.  Expense per day of care at community hospitals.  From Levit 
(1985), p.  23,  Column  3. exemptions and business status) are assumed to potentially affect both the cost 
of compliance and the amount of itemizable deductions.  Adjusted gtoss  income 
tsprssents both its important effects on  the tsx function and income effects on 
the demand  fot deductible  items of expenditure.  The identifying variables in- 
clude  investment income and three indices of the "price" of deductible ex- 
penses.  We posit that various rates of  taxation n  a stats and the prices of 
medical services affect the level of deductible expenses of otherwise identical 
taxpayers but do  not affect the cost of compliance, which depends on the com- 
plexity of the itemizstion process and not on the dollar value of  the indivi- 
dual deductions.  For example, the  resource cost of deducting a $1,000 hospital 
bill is equal to the resource cost of deducting a $2,000 hospital bill for the 
same set of hospital services.  (Hospital services are particularly attractive 
in this regard, since it seems unlikely that the complexity of deductible ex- 
penses  is responsive to this price.)  Likewise,  the complexity of deducting a 
property tax bill does not seem likely to depend  on its magnitude.'  Prices of 
certain itemizable deductions and tax rates affsct only dollar values of deduc- 
tions and not the complexity of itemizing them.  Investment income is  also ex- 
cluded from the cost of itemizing equation with similar reasoning.  Investment 
income generates deductible interest expenses of greater value but not greater 
complexity  than ordinery consumer credit.2 
4.  Results 
The itemitstion decision model described by equations I  and 2 was estimated 
by  maximizing  the likelihood given in  expression (5).  Parameter estimates and 
t—ratios are presented in Table 4—1 in the Appendix.  If  compliance costs are 
identically zero for all taxpayers our stochastic censoring threshold model 
would  collapse to a standard Tobit model.  A likelihood ratio test strongly —9— 
rejects the hypothesis  chat compliance costs are identically zero (2(9) 
59.).  Furthermore,  the  cost of compliance  is confirmed  to vary with  taxpayer 
characteristics,  since a test of the null hypothesis  that the slope parameters 
of the estimated stochastic cost of compliance equation are jointly zero  is 
also rejected (2(6)  21.0).  Similarly, the null hypothesis that tax saving 
does riot  vary with taxpayer characteristics  is also conclusively rejected 
(y2(10) = 20309).  Finally, a test of the null hypothesis that the identifying 
variables in  the  tax savings equation are jointly zero is rejected (2(4) 
750.2). 
ecause  the  parameter estimates are difficult to intpre directly, Table 
2 presents the implied impact effects of each variable, when evaluated at the 
mean characteristics  of each of three income classes.  These are changes in  the 
unconditional  expectations of potential  tax saving and the cost of Itemizing. 
Each of the statewide indicators of the  'price'  of itemizable deductions 
has the expected positive sign in the tax savings equation.  An increased price 
of hospital services, a higher level of state  income taxes,  and a higher level 
of property taxes all are positively  related  to tax savings.  Increasing the 
average rate of state income and sales tax by 0.01 (compared to a state average 
of  .050)  increases the potential tax saving from itemization by $23 for someone 
in the S10,000—$15,000 income range, by $54 for someone in the $20,000—$25,000 
range and by  $158 for someone in the S50,000$—75,000 income  range.  Increasing 
the average effective property tax by .01 (compared to a state mean  f  .013) 
increases potential  tax saving due to itemization by $33, $78, and $229 for 
these three income classes.  An increase of $100 in hospital expense per day 
(with a state averge  of $327), increases potential saving by $115, $205, and 
$490 for the three income classes.  Over most of its range, higher income iS 
associated with  higher tax saving, as are more personal exemptions and the Table 2 
Effects of Changes in Exogenous 
Variables un Tax Saving and 
the Cost of  Itemizing 
vins 
ACT Class 
$l0,000—14,999  25,000—29,999  50,000—74,999 
fACT  51,000  38.67  60.78  99.72 
flnvest  = $1,000  36.00  47.66  35.65 
Ltxempt  = 1  52.09  92.97  221.74 
Afiusiness  = 1  166.43  297.07  708.51 
iNar = 1  —29.21  —52.14  —124.35 
fAged  = 1  —100.31  —179.05  —427.04 
fStatstax  = .01  22.86  53.89  158.20 
AProptax  = .01  33.02  77.96  229.16 
f.Nedcost  = $100  115.13  205.49  490.09 
fTtemizin 
fACT = $1,000  1.21  2.03  1.69 
flxempt =  1  2.44  2.47  2.54 
fBusiness  1  —10.97  —11.11  —11.45 
dMar  1  —19.82  —20.06  —20.69 
fAged  1  —8.53  —8.64  —8.91 
Note:  These are changes in the unconditionsl expectations of tax saving and 
the cost of itemizing.  The AACI calculations do not include the 
effect  of changes in ACT on the variables  Statetax or Proptax.  The 
dStatetax  and fProptax calculations refer to changes in  the tax rates, 
holding ACI constant. presence of business or farm income.  8eing mar ied or hsving  so aqd  exemption 
is each associated with lower tam savings, other factor; being elJ )nstant. 
The explanatory variables in the cost of itemizing equation were not 55 
successful as  in the tax saving equation.  The presence of a farm ur business 
reduces  the  coat of itemizing by about 311,  presumably because detaled recor4s 
need to be  capt  aven in the absence of itemizing, so that the incremental cost 
is lower than otherwis.  Increased income increases the  cost of itemization 
over moat of  its range (the coat of Itemization is at a minimum at 39,368 of 
adjusted gross income), although a 31,000 increase raises cost only  by a dollar 
or two.  The impact of personal and aged exemptions is not significantly dif- 
ferent from zero, although being married is associated with s significant de- 
cline in cost of about $20. 
The estimated private cost of itemizing deductions, by  adjusted gross in- 
come clasa,  s  presented in Table  3.  These conditional expectations  sara cal- 
culated by  applying the mean  vector of 'haracteriatice of itemizers .eithln a 
class  to  the  estimated equation of Taole k—1.  The average cost of iremiziog 
for all itemizers is estimated  to be 343,00, which impllee an aggregate com- 
pliance cost of $1.44 billion in  1982. 
Except  for the lowest income class, the average coat of itemizing icreases 
monotsnically with income.4  This reflects predominantly the poeiti;e direct 
effect  of  income on cost, where  income ondoubtedly proxies for the value placed 
on an individuel'e time. 
Tsble 4 ehowe the  tax savings that are foregone because some taxpayers are 
dissuaded from itemizing by the transaction cost.  The first colamn  :ndicares 
thmt  there are 879,300 taxpayers who chose not to  itemize given  the  current 
cost of itemizing (so that T3 < c) but who would have itemized if  the cost 
were zero (TS > 0).  The second column of Table 4 shows that the foregone tax Table  3 
Estimated Cost of Itemizing 
by Mjusted Cross Income Class,  1982 
Number of  Average cost  Total cost of 
Adjusted gross  itemizers  of itemizing  a  itemz!ng for 
income clasa  (thousands)  for itemizers ($)  itemizers  (S millions) 
Less  than 5,000  690  23.95  16.52 
5,000—9,999  1,700  15.77  26.81 
10,000—14,999  2,745  12.26  33.66 
15,000—19,999  3,219  16.33  52.57 
20,000—24,999  4,228  25.08  106.02 
25,000—29,999  4,706  33.02  155.40 
30,000—39,999  7,657  45,01  344.63 
40,000-49,999  4,217  62.10  261.89 
50,000—74,999  2,871  86.43  248.15 
75,000—99,999  677  126.89  85.90 
100,000 and  723  146.  3  106.23 
above 
Total  33,433  43.00  1,437.78 
a  c.(.8 - Z)/a) 
E(C.  1.  = 1)  = 2  —  L  1  1 
1  1  i 
uv((8 
- -13- 
Table  4 
Number ',f Additional  It seizsrs and 
Tax Saving if Itemizing as  ostless 
Additional  itemizers  Total tax 
Adjustad gross  if cost of itemizing 
—  9  saving 
income  class  (thousands)  (5 millions) 
Lass than 5,300  38.1  1.9' 
5,000—9,999  60.5  1.53 
10,000—14,999  oO.4  12.43 
1S,000—19,9fl  74.L  43.6: 
20,000—24,999  1)8.7  51.00 
25,000—29,999  115.8  53.98 
30,000—39,999  153.3  14.6. 
40,000—49,999  5.e.8  6.14 
50,000—74,999  12.8  7.99 
75,000—99,999  0.2  1.60 
100,000  and 
above  0.1  1.36 
Total  679.3  196.18 —  4— 
saving of these taxpayers amounts  to 5196,2 million.  This is the revenue loss 
that the Treasury would suffer if the itemization process were costless,  This 
highlights  that the general goals of a tax system can conflict,  In this case 
making  the tax system less costly to comply with compromises  the revenue col- 
lection objective of the tax system. 
Finally, we  calculate the impact of increasing the minimum standard dedoc— 
tion allowed for all taxpayers, as was legislated n  the Tax Reform Act of 
1986.  This policy change has progressive implcatione  for vertical equity, as 
it eliminates all tax liability for many low—income households.  Preeumably  it 
also has a deleterious  effect on  horizontal equity, as it limits the applica- 
bility of a case—by—case standard for allowing deductions from taxable income. 
It also eliminates the tax incentive for increased charitable contributions and 
other deductible activities  for those taxpayers who no longer itemize.  Our 
analysis allows us to measure another impact of increasing the standard deduc- 
tion, the reductton in the aggregate coat of compliance.  Table  5  shows how, as 
the standard deduction is increased, the number of itemizing households de- 
clines and the total coat of itemizing declines.  An  acrosa—the—board  increase 
of $2,000 in the standard deduction reduces the coat of compliance  from $1.44 
to $1.07 billion, or by $370 million,  Note also that the average coat of  those 
householda who remain itemizers increases.  Thia occurs becauae the increased 
atandard deduction reduces itemizing predominantly among lower income taxpay- 
ers, who on average have a lower private cost of itemizing. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 contains several changes which affect the ex- 
tent of itemization, including the disallowance of the sales tax deduction, 
phaseout of the deduction for personal interest, and a floor on the deductabil— 
ity of miscellaneous expenses.  Tt also substantially increased the standard 
deduction for each category of taxpayer, by less than $1,000  for singles and —15— 
Table 5 
Number  of ItemizeTs and 
Cost  of Itemizing for Different Levels of 
the  Standard Deduction 
Standard  Standard 
1982 level  deduction  deduction 
of standard  increased by  increased by 
deduction  51,000  52,000 
Number of 
i  t  emi  z  era 
(millions)  33.4  26.6  20..) 
Total cost 
of itemizing 
(5 billions>  1.44  1.26  1.07 
Cost per 
1.  tCrniz  ing 
taxpayer  (5)  44.0  47.4  53.5 —16— 
more than $1,000 for married couples filing jointly and stogie heads of house- 
holds.  Our estimates suggest that this latter provision will reduce the pri— 
vats cost of complying with the tax law by approximately $0.18 billion. 
All of the foregoing estimates apply to the privately borne cost of steni— 
zaton, as  valued by the taxpayers.  roe social coat of compliance may, though, 
differ from  the private cost.  Most signIficantly,  for monetary expenditures 
the social  cost exceeds the privately—borne coat due to the deductibility of 
these expenses.  The social cost of these expenditures is thus approximately 
11(1 — t)  times  the privately borne cost,  where  t is  the marginal tax rate. 
5.  Conclusions 
The U.S. income  tax system allows taxpayers to deduct certain expenses 
from taxable incone in order to improve horizontal  equity and to encourage cer- 
tain activities,  such as charitable giving, deemed socially desirable.  This 
paper estimates that the privately borne cost in 1982 of allowing itemizable 
dsducticna above some limit amounted to $1.44 billion, with  the social cost 
being somewhat higher.  An increased standard deduction, as legislated in the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, enhances progresstvity, diminishes  the horizontal ecucy 
and incentive effects of itemization, but saves resource costs.  We estimate 
that increasing all taxpayers' standard deduction by 51,000 would save $180 
million in  privately borne costs, and increasing it  by $2,000 would save $370 
million. 
Earlier studies of the compliance cost of taxation have been based on aur— 
vey responses, and therefore are subject to error due to faulty memory or de- 
liberate misrepresentation.  How to value taxpayers' tine spent on  tax matters 
is also a difficult problem in  such studies.  In  addition, only tangible re- 
source costs of compliance can be measured with any accuracy.  This paper -17- 
proposes a methodology  Lo infer the coat of corn  liance from caxpayrs'  observed 
beha;ior  Thus Ic is not biased  by survey reap nec inac-iracy and :apclree 
psychic costs as well as the taxpayer's Valuati)n of time and other resources 
used in tax compliance.  These advantages make it a promising methodology for 
eetimeting the compliance coei of other regulatory requIremente —18— 
Footnotes 
1.  The existence of a state  income tax 15 likely to  complicate  the itemiza- 
tion procedure.  Adding a dummy variable for the presence of a state in- 
come tax in the coat of compliance equation was unsuccessful——the likeli- 
hood would not converge.  Of  the 13,409 recorda, only 80 were from states 
without an income tax,  so that this influence  is unlikely to be  qualita- 
tively  important. 
2.  If  investment income is included as an  explanatory  variable of  cost of 
compliance,  it is not statistically significant  at common levels of 
significance. 
3.  The results reported here and in Table 4  for the lowest and highest adjusted 
gross  income classes were obtained by applying the mean characteristics of 
the adjacent income class except in  the case of income, in which case 
55,000 was used for the less thsn $5,000 class and $100,000 was used for 
the over $100,000 class. 
4.  The nonmonotonicity  probably reflects the fact that taxpayers with  low re- 
ported adjusted gross  income are often not "poor," but have temporarily  low 




Maximuo Likelihood Estimates of the Itetization Decision MoSel 
Asymp  tot  ic 
Tax Savings Eqoation:  Parameter  C—ratio 
Intercept  9.346  85.21 
ACT  —0.882  —13.73 
ACISQ  (x102)  25.892  21.62 
Exempt  (x102)  4.571  12.01 
Business (x102)  13.928  14.06 
Mar (x102)  —2.658  —1.92 
Aged (x102)  —9.439  —9.30 
Medcost (x132)  9.837  15.20 
Invinc  (KiD2)  1.073  6.36 
Statetax (xiO)  1.161  17.97 
Proptax (x102)  0,807  3.42 
0.474  148.83 
Coat  of Itemizing Eqoatton: 
Intercept  7.527  216.90 
ACT  —0.069  —2.79 
ACISQ  (x102)  1.530  2.97 
Exempt (102)  0.142  1.02 
Business (xlO2)  -0.643  -1.75 
Mar  (x102)  -1.165  -2.60 
Aged (x102)  —0.500  —1.31 
v 
0.013  6.52 
0.0003  0.09 
Ui, 
Log Likelihood  —919.69 
No,  of Obsereations  13409 
Variables are defined and scaled as follows: 
Tax savings  = ln(TS  + 1700) 
Cost of itemizing = in(C  + 1700) 
ACT  = ln(adjusted gross income) 
ACISQ  ACT2 
Exempt  = number  of  personal  exemptions 
Mar  =  1  if  married, 0 otherwise 
Aged  = number of aged deductions taken 
Medcost  = hospital  expense per day 
Invinc  if (dividends + interest income + capital gains)  > 3; 
then ln(dividends  interest income 4 capital gains) 
otherwise 0. 
Statetsx  atate tax rate defined as a fraction x ACT (defined aboce) 
Proptax  = property  tax rate defined as a fraction x ACT (defined 
above) —20— 
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